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In daily life and in courtrooms, people regularly analyze the minds of others to understand
intentions. Specifically, the detection of intentions behind prior events is one of the main
issues dealt with in courtrooms. To our knowledge, there are no experimental works
focused on the use of memory detection techniques to detect past intentions. This
study aims at investigating whether reaction times (RTs) could be used for this purpose,
by evaluating the accuracy of the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) in
the detection of past intentions. Sixty healthy volunteers took part in the experiment
(mean age: 36.5 y; range: 18–55; 30 males). Participants were asked to recall and report
information about a meeting with a person that had occurred at least 1 month before. Half
of the participants were required to report about an intentional meeting, whereas the other
half reported on a chance meeting. Based on the conveyed information, participants
performed a tailored aIAT in which they had to categorize real reported information
contrasted with counterfeit information. Results demonstrated that RTs can be a useful
measure for the detection of past intentions and that aIAT can detect real past intentions
with an accuracy of 95%.
Keywords: past intentions, reaction times, mens rea, autobiographical Implicit Association Test, voluntary
manslaughter
INTRODUCTION
“Andreas Lubitz was alone in the cockpit, breathing in silence, as his captain pounded on a locked
door and passengers screamed. Those chilling sounds—captured in a black-box recording—have left
French investigators with little doubt that the crash that killed 150 people aboard Flight 9525 was
deliberate.” These are the words used by The Wall Street Journal on March 26th, 2015 to describe
the tragic plane crash of a few days before.
The ability to detect intentions takes on great importance for investigators and intelligence,
as it deals with the issue of preventing criminal acts from occurring (Vrij et al., 2011). In the
research field, intention is defined as an actor’s mental state preceding a corresponding action,
usually coming with a strong commitment to perform the intended action (Malle et al., 2001) and
often accompanied by a degree of planning (Granhag and Mac Giolla, 2014). Searle (1983) refers
to these deliberations of a future action as “prior intentions” and as the initial representation of
the goal of an action prior to the initiation of the action. These definitions presume that prior
intentions are not just derived from a vague willpower concerning the actor’s life but are also
targeted and purpose-driven, associated with a planning of the necessary actions to reach the end
goal. Moreover, some researchers argue that there are different types of intentions from a temporal
Zangrossi et al. The detection of past intentions
point of view and suggest a possible distinction between long-
term antecedents of action (prior intentions; Searle, 1983) and
short-term antecedents of actions (intentions in action; Searle,
1983; Becchio et al., 2008a,b; Sartori et al., 2009). In some legal
systems, such as in the United States, the concept of intentionality
has many synonyms including voluntarily, purposely, knowingly,
and willfully (Malle and Nelson, 2003). Thus, the concept of
“intention” as antecedent of action is strongly related to those
of volition, free will, and responsibility. In the legal context,
decisions are based on the assumption that human behavior
is driven by intentions; therefore, individuals are considered
responsible for their voluntary actions insofar as they behave on
the basis of their own free will.
In cognitive neuroscience, this has been a challenging issue
since the first experiment by Libet et al. (1983). These authors
found that the Readiness Potential (RP) precedes the awareness
of the intention to act by 300–800ms, demonstrating that
subjective awareness of a voluntary action occurs after the
ultimate initiation of the act (Libet et al., 1983). According
to Hallett (2007), under this perspective, intention could be
considered as a perception of a motor state that has already
been determined in the brain. Starting from this standpoint, a
number of independent research groups found that the conscious
intention is preceded by unconscious brain activity in the motor
areas (e.g., Haggard and Eimer, 1999; Rigoni et al., 2013) and
that through this unaware activity it is possible to predict the
outcome of a decision up to several seconds before it enters
awareness (e.g., Soon et al., 2008, 2013). Moreover, some research
focused on the detection of prior intentions, distinguishing them
from lies. For instance, in one of the first experiments on lying
about intentions, Vrij et al. (2011) asked passengers in an airport
departure hall to tell the truth or to lie about their forthcoming
trip. The authors found that, analyzing the plausibility of the
answers to an interview, the accuracy in the detection of truth
tellers and liars was 72 and 74%, respectively (Vrij et al., 2011).
In another study (Agosta et al., 2011a), researchers went a step
further, investigating whether real and false intentions could
be distinguished through reaction times (RTs), and they found
an accuracy of 100% in discriminating prior intentions from
plausible but false intentions and from the subject’s hopes and
expectations.
Taken together, these data suggest that real intentions are
detectable through cognitive and behavioral cues.
Unfortunately, in almost all criminal cases, such as the plane
crash of March 2015 mentioned above, society has to deal
with the impossibility of detecting intentions before a crime
happens. Thus, the focus must move from the ideal goal of
crime prevention to a better understanding of crimes after
they happen. In daily life and in courtrooms, people regularly
analyze the goings-on in the minds of others. For thousands
of years, moral and legal systems have encompassed concepts
such as intention, motive, and forethought when debating their
proper definition and their relation to responsibility, blame,
and punishment (Malle and Nelson, 2003). In modern society,
too, although growing importance is given to computers and
machines, no one would accept as fair and legitimate a legal
system that avoids considerations of an agent’s mental state when
committing a crime. For this reason, in criminal law, judges
are requested to enter the criminal’s mind in order to reach as
thorough as possible an understanding of his intentions and thus
to choose an appropriate punishment. Basically, four conditions
have to be satisfied to establish criminal responsibility: (a) the
defendant must have committed an act which is considered a
crime (this is called the actus reus in common law systems); (b)
that act must have been committed in a specific “state of mind”
(this is known as the mens rea in common law systems); (c)
there must be a causal connection between the crime and the
prohibited consequences; and (d) there must be an absence of
circumstances that would constitute a legal defense to any crime
charged (Carson and Felthous, 2003).
Therefore, considering the above-mentioned legal framework,
we can state that in this study we face the concept of mens rea
from a neuroscientific point of view. The concept of mens rea
refers to the intent of committing the offense; it is the mental
element of an offense, including the awareness by a person that
his or her own conduct is criminal. Under this perspective,
detection of intentions behind an occurred event (crime) is
one of the main issues dealt with in courtrooms. Nevertheless,
this target is pursued basically through an inferential process
based on behavioral and circumstantial evidence, usually without
considering a scientific approach to autobiographical memory
as the key for detecting past intentions. Some research suggests
that a range of physiological (e.g., see Meijer et al., 2014),
psychophysiological (e.g., Winograd and Rosenfeld, 2010; Nahari
and Ben-Shakhar, 2011), neural (e.g., Rissman et al., 2010),
and cognitive (e.g., Sartori et al., 2008) parameters might be
used to detect memories. The so-called Memory Detection
refers to a family of techniques using indirect measures to
detect memories (e.g., a real autobiographical memory) among
alternatives. Basically, whereas the goal of lie detection is to
identify whether a response is a truthful response or a lie, the
target of memory detection is to establish whether a specific
event is represented in a subject’s autobiographical memory. In
general, this methodology is based on the comparison between
critical information (included in a specific autobiographical
memory) together with similar, but not critical, information
(plausible, but not part of that memory). One of the potentially
most efficient cognitive measures for memory detection is
represented by RTs (e.g., Seymour et al., 2000; Seymour and
Kerlin, 2008).
To our knowledge there are no experimental works focused on
the use of memory detection techniques to detect past intentions,
except for a study focused on the detection of reasons for
producing so-called “white lies” (Agosta et al., 2013), a subtype
of lies which most people tell on a daily basis in order to place
themselves or others in a more positive light (Granhag and Vrij,
2005). These authors tested the accuracy of the autobiographical
Implicit Association Test (aIAT; Sartori et al., 2008), a memory
detection tool based on the analysis of a subject’s RTs, in detecting
reasons underlying white lies. Themain results indicate that aIAT
can accurately discriminate real reasons underlying white lies in
95% of cases.
Here we present an experiment aimed at evaluating whether
past intentions may be identified using the aIAT.
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The aIAT (Sartori et al., 2008) is a novel variant of the
Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998) that can be
used to establish whether an autobiographical memory trace
is encoded within the respondent’s mind. More specifically,
with the aIAT, it is possible to evaluate which one of two
autobiographical events is true (Sartori et al., 2008). Nevertheless,
aIAT has been tested in different domains and on different
constructs such as future, medium, and long-term intentions
(Agosta et al., 2011a), white lies and underlying intentions
(Agosta et al., 2013), mock crimes (Sartori et al., 2008), holidays
(Sartori et al., 2008), cocaine/heroine consumption (Sartori et al.,
2008), driver’s licenses (Sartori et al., 2008), flashbulb memories
(e.g., Curci et al., 2015), and whiplash malingering (Sartori et al.,
2007). Thus, the aIAT has been validated in both forensic and
clinical settings. It has been demonstrated that this tool can
determine which of two autobiographical events is true with
91% accuracy (Sartori et al., 2008). Despite the different kinds
of investigations and constructs aIAT has been applied to (see
Agosta and Sartori, 2013, for a review), the method’s structure
is always maintained.
The aIAT includes stimuli belonging to four categories: two
of them are logical categories represented by sentences that are
certainly true (e.g., “I am in front of a computer”) or certainly
false (e.g., “I am climbing a mountain”) for the respondent
and relate to the moment of testing. The other two categories
are represented by alternative versions of the construct under
investigation (e.g., “I went to Paris for Christmas” vs. “I went to
London for Christmas”) only one of the two being true. The task
is basically a categorization task. The basic principle of aIAT is
that the pairing of sentences about a truly autobiographical event
with certainly true sentences should facilitate faster responses,
so that the specific pattern of RTs for the double categorization
blocks indicates which autobiographical event is either true or
false. The true autobiographical event is identified because it
determines faster RTs when sharing the same motor response
with certainly true sentences.
The aIAT is structured in five classification blocks: three
simple categorization blocks (1, 2, 4), and two combined
categorization blocks (3 and 5). In simple blocks, each response
button is used to classify sentences related to only one category.
In double blocks, each response button is used to classify
sentences related to two different categories. In Block 1,
participants have to classify true and false sentences (e.g., I
am in front of a computer vs. I am in front of a television)
using two response keys, one on the left and one on the
right of the keyboard. In Block 2, participants have to classify
autobiographical sentences (e.g., I went to Paris for Christmas vs.
I went to New York for Christmas) with the same two response
keys. In Block 3 (double categorization block), true sentences
and sentences related to the first autobiographical event (e.g.,
Christmas in Paris) are paired on the same response key and false
sentences and sentences related to the second autobiographical
event (e.g., Christmas in New York) are classified with the
other response key. In Block 4, only autobiographical events are
reverse classified with the two response keys. Finally, in Block 5,
participants have to classify both true sentences and sentences
related to the second autobiographical event (Christmas in New
York) with the same response key, and false sentences and the
first autobiographical event (Christmas in Paris) with the other
key.
As already noted, aIAT is a flexible tool and has been applied
to different constructs. This is possible because one of the main
features of aIAT is that items are presented as sentences. For this
reason, aIAT can be considered as an adequate tool to describe
intentions in full.
In previous works, aIAT was used to detect prior intentions
about future actions (Agosta et al., 2011a) and reasons underlying
previously told white lies (Agosta et al., 2013), but it was
never applied to the detection of intentions behind a past
autobiographical event. Here we present an experiment aimed at
evaluating whether past intentions may be identified using the
aIAT (Sartori et al., 2008). We investigated past intentions by
asking subjects to recall and describe an accidental meeting or
an intentionally planned one.
METHODS
Participants
Sixty healthy volunteers took part in the experiment (mean
age: 36.5 y; range: 18–55; 30 males). All of them gave a
signed informed consent, and the project has been approved
by the Ethical Committee for the Psychological Research of the
University of Padua. Participants were subdivided in two groups:
the “chance” group and the “intentional” group, on the basis of
the intentionality underlying a reported meeting with a person at
least 1 month before. Each group was composed of 30 subjects
(15 males).
Materials and Procedure
In Phase 1, participants were asked to recall a meeting with a
person that occurred at least 1 month before and to fill out
a form reporting its main features. Participants in the chance
group were requested to report a meeting that happened by
chance; in particular, they were asked to specify (a) who they
met (his/her name and role in their life), (b) when the meeting
happened, (c) what they were doing, and (d) where they were at
that moment. By contrast, participants in the intentional group
were requested to report an intentional and planned meeting
specifying (a) who they decided to meet, (b) how they organized
the meeting, (c) why they wanted to meet that person, and (d)
at what time and (e) where they decided to meet. Moreover,
participants in the intentional group were told that they should
have directly organized the selected meeting and that it should
not have been a routine meeting. After that, starting from the
specific information provided by each participant through the
form, we built sentences about the real intentionality underlying
the meeting (intentionally organized vs. happened by chance)
and sentences describing the opposite scenario.
An example of a sentence about real intentions for participants
in the chance group was “I met Andrew by chance,” while an
opposite sentence for the same participant was “I decided to
meet Andrew.” In the same way, sentences for the intentional
group described their meeting planning and an unreal scenario in
which they met the person by chance. In Phase 2, these sentences
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were used to build a tailored aIAT for each participant. The
participants’ task on the aIAT was to logically categorize true
and false statements related to the moment of testing (taken
from previous research: e.g., “I’m in front of a computer”)
and statements about real and counterfeit intentions related to
the meeting reported in Phase 1 (into categories “Chance” vs.
“Intentional”; see Table 1 for a sample list of sentences used in
the experiment). Each of the four categories (true vs. false and
Chance vs. Intentional) was represented by five statements.
Participants completed five separate blocks of categorization
trials, as expected by the previously discussed standard aIAT
structure (as shown in Figure 1).
For each trial, the stimulus sentence was presented in the
center of the screen. The participants were requested to classify
the sentence as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing
one of two keys, one on the right (i.e., key L) and one on
the left (i.e., key A) of a keyboard. Greenwald and Nosek
(2001) reported no effects on IAT scores of subject self-reported
TABLE 1 | An example of a sentences’ list used in the experiment.
Labels Italian sentences English translation
True 1. Sono di fronte ad un computer 1. I’m in front of a computer
2. Sto rispondendo con la tastiera 2. I’m answering with the
keyboard
3. Sono seduto sulla sedia 3. I’m sitting on a chair
4. Sto facendo un test di
Psicologia
4. I’m doing a psychological test
5. Sono in università 5. I’m inside the university
building
False 1. Sono di fronte ad un televisore 1. I’m in front of the television
2. Sto rispondendo con la matita 2. I’m answering with the pencil
3. Sono seduto sulla panchina 3. I’ sitting on a bench
4. Sto facendo un test di
matematica
4. I’m doing a mathematical test
5. Sono in ospedale 5. I’m inside the hospital building
Chance 1.Ho incontrato Andrea per caso 1. I met Andrew by chance
2.Ho visto Andrea senza
prevederlo
2. I met Andrew without predict it
3.Ho incrociato Andrea per strada 3. I met and crossed Andrew on
the road
4.Ho trovato Andrea senza volerlo 4. I didn’t want to came across
Andrew
5.Mi sono imbattuta nel mio ex
compagno
5. I did chance upon my
ex-boyfriend
Intentional 1.Ho deciso di trovarmi con
Andrea
1. I decided to come across
Andrew
2.Ho sentito Andrea per trovarci 2. I got in touch with Andrew to
meet him
3.Ho deciso di incontrare Andrea 3. I planned to meet Andrew
4.Volevo vedere Andrea lungo il
fiume
4. I wanted to see Andrew on the
river
5.Ho voluto vedere il mio ex
compagno
5. I desired to meet my
ex-boyfriend
This is an example of sentences’ list coming from a participant in the chance group.
handedness. In Block 1 (20 trials), participants classified stimuli
along the logical dimension (true vs. false) by pressing the left
key if the sentence was true (e.g., “I’m in front of a computer”)
or the right key if the sentence was false (e.g., “I’m in front
of a television”). In Block 2 (20 trials), participants classified
sentences along the critical dimension: Intentional vs. Chance.
They were asked to press the left key to classify sentences
expressing the real information they reported (for an intentional
group participant, e.g., “I decided to meet Andrew”) and to
press the right key to classify sentences expressing counterfeit
information (for an intentional group participant, e.g., “I met
Andrew by chance”). In Block 3 (60 trials, double categorization
block), true sentences and sentences describing real participants’
information were associated (“congruent” block). Participants
were requested to press the left key if the sentence was either
true or indicated the real information they gave and the right
key if the sentence was false or indicated counterfeit information
(e.g., an intentional group participant pressed the left key for
true and for “Intentional” sentences and the right key for false
and for “Chance” sentences). In Block 4 (40 trials), participants
were requested to perform a reversed classification of Block 2:
they pressed the left key for counterfeit information sentences
and the right key for real information sentences. In Block 5 (60
trials, double categorization block), true sentences and sentences
describing counterfeit participants’ information were associated
(“incongruent” block). Participants were asked to press the
left key for true sentences and sentences about counterfeit
information, and the right key for false sentences and sentences
about real information (e.g., an intentional group participant
pressed the left key for true and for “Chance” sentences and the
right key for false and for “Intentional” sentences).
Labels indicating category names were displayed on the
computer screen for the entire duration of the experiment.
Previous works (Agosta et al., 2011c, 2013) showed that when
comparing a direct version (with Block 3 as congruent and Block
5 as incongruent) and a reversed version (Block 3 as incongruent
and Block 5 as congruent) of aIAT, there was no reduction
in accuracy for the identification of the true autobiographical
memory (Agosta and Sartori, 2013); thus, in this study only the
direct version was administered.
The comparison between RTs in congruent and incongruent
blocks is the key point for the aIAT data analysis (Sartori et al.,
2008). Blocks 1, 2, and 4 are considered as training blocks and
they are not contemplated in the analysis.
Dependent Measures
Two dependent measures were considered: RTs for the double
categorization blocks (Blocks 3 and 5) and the D-IAT
index (Greenwald et al., 2003) calculated for each participant
independently. Before any further analysis, RTs shorter than
150ms or longer than 10,000ms were discarded; moreover,
RTs for incorrect responses were replaced with the mean of
correct latencies plus 600ms. The D-IAT index was calculated
by subtracting the average RTs of the congruent block from
the average RTs of the incongruent block and then dividing
this difference by the “inclusive” standard deviation of subject
response latencies in the two combined blocks (Greenwald et al.,
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FIGURE 1 | An example of the experimental procedure of the aIAT built for an intentional group participant. Participants were asked to classify the stimulus
(i.e., the sentence displayed) as fast and accurately as possible by pressing the left (i.e., “A” key) or the right (i.e., “L” key) key. In Block 3 (congruent block) logically true
sentences and stimuli describing real information (about the intentionality behind the reported meeting) shared the same response key (i.e., the left key). In Block 5
(incongruent block) the left response key was shared by true sentences and stimuli describing counterfeit information.
2003). As this index is grounded on the difference between
incongruent and congruent blocks, it results in a positive value
if response latencies are faster in the congruent than in the
incongruent block; otherwise the value is negative. Therefore,
this indicates an association between the categories sharing the
same motor response in the congruent block (Greenwald et al.,
1998; Sartori et al., 2008). In our experiment, the positive value
of a participant’s D-IAT states that there is an implicit association
between true statements and sentences about the real degree of
intentionality, leading to a correct classification. Greenwald et al.
(2003) argued that in a sense, D-IAT can be seen as an effect
size measure, as the division of a difference between means by
a standard deviation is similar to one of the most known effect
size measures, Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1977). The distinction is that
the standard deviation in the D-IAT is computed from the scores
in both blocks, ignoring the condition (Greenwald et al., 2003).
Data Analysis
Given the structure of the RTs data, we used a generalized
linear mixed-effect model approach (Pinheiro and Bates, 2000)
to investigate whether Congruency (congruent vs. incongruent)
had an effect on response latencies in a group analysis. This
statistical approach has been applied in many research areas
(e.g., Goldstein, 2005; Faraway, 2006; Malcolm et al., 2008;
Levitan et al., 2015), and recently it has been suggested for the
analysis of RTs (Baayen and Milin, 2010), as it is considered
an effective method in dealing with complex data. The use of
mixed-effect models entails several advantages, in particular they
allow the simultaneous consideration of all factors potentially
contributing to the data understanding (Baayen et al., 2008).
These factors include not only the fixed effect factors (controlled
by the experimenter) but also so-called random effects factors
(e.g., participants), characterized by the fact that their levels are
randomly drawn from a population (Di Giorgio et al., 2012).
In the present study, mixed-effects models were adopted not
only to deal with the skewness of data distribution, but for two
main reasons specifically linked to aIAT features: (a) to include
repeated measures in the model, without the need to average
across trials and thus enhancing statistical power; and (b) to
model participants’ individual differences in RTs distribution as
random effect.
Three Generalized Linear Mixed-Effects regression models
with maximum likelihood estimation were built, with reaction-
times as dependent variable, subject as the random effect factor
and Congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and Group (chance
vs. intentional) as fixed effects regressors. The null model—model
0—contained random effect only. Model 1 included Congruency
as predictor, and in Model 2 the contribution of Group was
added. We chose to use a Gamma-family function as link
function as it is considered a good model for approximating
RTs (Whelan, 2008; Baayen and Milin, 2010). Models were
then compared through the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC;
Akaike, 1987) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC;
Schwarz, 1978).
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Because we used a Gamma-family link function to deal with
the non-normality of RTs data, the β regression coefficients
estimate of our best model was not directly interpretable in a
quantitative sense. Thus, in order to reach a better understanding
of the Congruency effect on RTs, we back-transformed the
corresponding β coefficient. In particular, we applied the inverse
of the Gamma link function and we calculated the difference







where α was the model intercept and β was the Congruency
coefficient.
For the D-IAT analysis, first we calculated a specific D-
IAT for each participant to examine the aIAT’s accuracy, as
discussed above. Then a linear regression model with only Group
variable as predictor was built to investigate whether there was
a difference in D-IATs between groups. Congruency was not
considered in the model because D-IAT itself expresses the
congruency effect.
All analyses were performed using R software (R Core Team,
2013). For generalized linear mixed-effect models, we used the
R package lme4 (Bates and Maechler, 2010). Results for each
dependent variable are presented in the following section.
RESULTS
The model comparison showed that both AIC and BIC decreased
from 107,985 and 108,005, respectively, for the model with only
the random effect included (Model 0) to 107,328 and 107,355,
respectively, for the model with the Congruency predictor added
(Model 1), resulting in the best model to explain the data
distribution (Table 2). The addition of the Group variable (Model
2) did not significantly contribute toward explaining the data,
as AIC remained the same while BIC was higher (107,362)
indicating the most parsimonious model—Model 1—as the
better one. This was confirmed through a Likelihood Ratio Test
(LR) which showed that Model 1 was significantly better than
Model 0 [χ2
(4)
= 658.7, p < 0.001] and that Model 2 was
not significantly better than Model 1 (p = 0.11) in explaining
data.
Thus, a significant Congruency effect on RTs emerged
(z=−25.47, p < 0.001; Figure 2). This difference was quantified
TABLE 2 | Model comparison.
Dependent variable: RTs
Model AIC BIC
Model 0: random effect 107,985 108,005
Model 1: random effect + Congruency 107,328 107,355
Model 2: random effect + Congruency + Group 107,328 107,362
Random and fixed effect factors predicting RTs. RTs, reaction-times; AIC, Akaike
Information Criterion; BIC, Bayesian Information Criterion.
(ICDiff) and indicated that RTs in the incongruent block were
381.12ms higher than those in congruent block.
The mean D-IAT for the chance group was 0.61 (SD =
0.45, SE = 0.083), whereas for the intentional group it was 0.56
(SD = 0.32, SE = 0.059). Because the mean D-IAT for both
groups was positive, this indicates that at a group level, past
intentions were correctly identified. The regression model for the
D-IAT was not significant, indicating that the Group factor did
not significantly influence D-IAT (p = 0.60). At an individual
level, 57/60 participants’ past intentions were correctly detected.
Two of the three misclassification cases come from the chance
group (Table 3). Thus, the accuracy for the chance group was
93.3% and for the intentional group was 96.7%, leading to an
overall accuracy of 95%. The mean D-IAT for the correctly
classified participants (positive) was 0.63 (SD= 0.35, SE= 0.046),
which is consistent with studies using aIAT on autobiographical
memories but lower than that reported in studies on flashbulb
memories (e.g., Curci et al., 2015). On the other hand, the mean
D-IAT for the misclassified participants (negative) was −0.25
(SD= 0.20, SE= 0.12).
FIGURE 2 | The effect of Congruency on reaction times (RTs). Figure
shows the difference in RTs between congruent and incongruent block. Block
3 is the congruent block, whereas Block 5 is the incongruent one. Value of RTs
according to the block are represented with their 95% Confidence Interval.
TABLE 3 | Classification accuracy.
Group Chance Intentional Total
D-IAT
+ n. 28 29 57
% 93.3 96.7 95
− n. 2 1 3
% 6.7 3.3 5
Total 30 30 60
Number of correctly classified and misclassified participants through D-IAT for each group
and for the whole sample with corresponding percentage accuracy. Positive D-IAT values
(+) indicate correct classification, while negative values (-) indicate misclassification.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Studies on lies and memory detection have shown that a
number of psychophysiological, neural, cognitive, and behavioral
measures can be useful to detect real intentions for future
actions. To our knowledge none of the previous investigations
focused on the detection of intentions behind actions (events)
that occurred in the past. Our experiment aimed at investigating
whether the analysis of RTs could be useful in detecting past
intentions, and in particular at evaluating a variant of the Implicit
Association Test, the autobiographical Implicit Association Test
(aIAT), as past intentions’ detector. We analyzed reaction-times
data collected from a sample of 60 participants performing an
aIAT task about the intentionality behind a recent meeting with
a person they already knew. As different participants reported
different meetings, each participant performed a specific tailored
aIAT. Our findings show that a significant effect of congruency
emerged, if considering all sample data through a Generalized
Linear Mixed-Model. That is, in the condition in which true
statements and real intentions shared the same motor response,
RTs were shorter when compared to those in the condition
in which the same response button was shared between true
statements and false intentions. This effect is called compatibility
effect. According to the originators of the IAT (Greenwald et al.,
1998), the basis of this effect is the conceptual association
between the target and the attribute categories (Kinoshita and
Peek-O’Leary, 2005). In the case of the aIAT, it refers to the
conceptual association between one of the two versions of the
construct under investigation (e.g., intentional meeting) and
a logical category (e.g., True). This, in the memory detection
perspective, indicates that one of the two versions of the construct
under investigation matches with an autobiographical memory
and could indicate that information about intentions is encoded
in the episodic memories of events. The next step we made
was to quantify the amount of compatibility effect for each
subject independently through the calculation of the D-IAT
Index (Greenwald et al., 2003). Thus, this index allowed us to
assess the strength of the association between true statements
and real/counterfeit intentionality. On the basis of the sign
of the D-IAT Index, as explained in the Methods section, we
consequently investigated the accuracy of the aIAT in identifying
the real intentions behind each subject’s reported event. Results
demonstrated that it is possible to identify a past intention
through the use of the aIAT with an accuracy of 95% (93.3%
sensitivity, 96.7% specificity). Thus, the difference in RTs between
the congruent and the incongruent condition—the compatibility
effect—was able to detect real past intentions.
In a previous study about the detection of future intentions
(Agosta et al., 2011a) the neural basis of the compatibility effect in
the aIAT was investigated using Event-Related Potentials (ERPs).
The authors found that Late Positive Component (LPC) had
smaller amplitude for the incongruent than for the congruent
block. In previous ERP studies, this component was found to be
sensitive to conflicting information (Magliero et al., 1984; Doucet
and Stelmack, 1999), thus reflecting the allocation of resources
between two simultaneous tasks (for reviews, see Johnson, 1986,
1993). In particular, several studies demonstrated that previously
learned items elicited larger LPCs than unlearned items over the
left parietal scalp in the interval between 500 and 800ms post-
stimulus (e.g., Johnson et al., 1985; Van Petten et al., 1991; Smith,
1993; Johnson, 1995; Wilding et al., 1995), and that this measure
was independent from subject’s explicit response (e.g., Smith,
1993; Wilding et al., 1995; Johnson et al., 1998). Moreover, this
measure was not significantly altered in participants who feigned
amnesia (Tardif et al., 2000) or who responded deceptively or
carried out some attempt to alter their performance (Johnson
et al., 2003). This effect is referred to as episodic memory (EM)
effect. Taken together, these results indicate that the parietal EM
effect reflects the memory status of the item rather than the status
explicitly declared by the subject (Johnson et al., 2003).
More importantly, this enhancement of LPC activity, elicited
by stimuli matching episodic memory, appears to be associated
with a pattern of shorter RTs (Johnson, 1995; Johnson et al.,
1998, 2003) which is basically what is detected by aIAT. These
findings support the idea that during the incongruent block,
the cognitive load is greater when compared to that during
the congruent block. In the aIAT’s incongruent condition,
participants are requested to associate the real autobiographical
memory with false statements. So, because of the familiarity with
the stimuli referring to the real autobiographical memory and
their automatic association with the concept of “truth,” this task
is more cognitively demanding and responses are slower.
The increase in cognitive load is also considered as a
key feature for the deceptive process. A growing body of
evidence supports the assumption that lying requires a greater
cognitive load compared to telling the truth (Zuckerman et al.,
1981; Vrij et al., 2006), adding a constant additional time to
RTs independently from the complexity of the task or the
response method (Sheridan and Flowers, 2010). Thus, some lie
detection techniques are based on RTs analysis, starting from the
assumption that, while deceiving, a subject would be slower and
more error-prone (see Verschuere and De Houwer, 2011, for a
review). An example of these techniques is the RT-based version
of the Concealed Information Test (CIT; see Verschuere et al.,
2011, for a review) previously referred to as the Guilty Knowledge
Test (GKT; Lykken, 1959), which has been investigated in
laboratory research (e.g., Ben-Shakhar and Elaad, 2003; Meijer
et al., 2014) and is also used in criminal investigations in Japan
(Osugi, 2011).
The need for a science-based assessment of specific
autobiographical memories seems to be increasing in criminal
trials, as it operates within a set of rules aimed at establishing
overt blameworthy behaviors (actus reus) inferred from (guilty)
covert mental states. The beliefs, intentions, and motivations of
the defendant (mens rea) are post-hoc inferred from behavior
and the reconstruction of contextual events, without the use
of any kind of accurate and reliable science-based tool. In the
present study we demonstrated that RTs analysis could be useful
to accurately detect past intentions.
Starting from this viewpoint, other factors not investigated in
this study which could potentially influence aIAT performance in
detecting past intentions are, for example, emotional connotation
of the reported event and compatibility with our motivations. For
instance, consider a hypothetical case of a man who died after
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being hit by a car while crossing the street on foot. In this case
the driver would be accused of vehicular manslaughter (without
volition). At this stage, imagine that investigators discovered that
the driver was familiar with the victim and that they had had
problems in the past (e.g., the driver was the ex-boyfriend of
the victim’s current girlfriend). Based only on this information,
investigators could reconstruct the driver’s mens rea suggesting
that since the defendant had a reason to hate the jaywalker, he
should be prosecuted for voluntary manslaughter rather than
vehicular manslaughter. In a case like this, investigators may
attribute intentionality concerning a crime through an inferential
process based on behavioral and circumstance evidence. The
critical point in our opinion is that, from this perspective,
reason and intention are considered as the same concept. In this
context, adding information derived from an accurate tool in
the detection of past intentions could be extremely important.
Kaasa et al. (2011) faced the issue about accuracy in recalling
reasons behind behavior after long delays. In their experiments,
participants were first (Time 1) asked to fill out a survey
about their music interests and the reasons behind the most
recent purchase of a music compact-disc (CD). Then, after 6–
12 months (Time 2) a follow-up survey was sent. Finally, a
subset of participants was contacted after 6–12 months from
Time 2 (Time 3), and they were asked to fill out a third survey.
One of the main findings of this study was that only about
one-fifth of the participants were able to consistently recall the
real reasons why they bought the CD. We think that such an
important finding, however, does not undermine our results for
at least two reasons: (a) participants in the present study were
asked not about the reasons behind their behavior but about the
degree of intentionality behind an event they lived and (b) the
autobiographical memory on which the task focused was decided
by participants and not imposed by experimenters.
This last point could be considered a limitation of this study,
in particular if considering the forensic context. Indeed, in
criminal trials, a defendant is specifically questioned about an
event (characterized by a criminal behavior) he/she lived. Thus,
obviously, the autobiographical memory is not freely chosen by
the person. Moreover, further studies should consider a group
of participants instructed to deceive in order to investigate the
possibility to fake the aIAT, already analyzed for different versions
of the test (Agosta et al., 2011b).
The results by Kaasa et al. (2011), however, suggest a question
regarding the detection of past intentions: if a fortuitous event
reflects a vague motivation, how much do we feel implicitly
responsible for it and to what extent does this feeling affect our
performance on aIAT? A preliminary answer is given by Agosta
et al. (2011a) in their work concerning prior intentions about
a future action, in which they found good aIAT accuracy both
in detecting prior intentions and in distinguishing them from
the subject’s hopes and expectations. Thus, future research could
focus on testing aIAT accuracy in distinguishing between past
intentions and motives behind a past event.
The aIAT’s original purpose was to identify a true past
autobiographical event from an alternative event. Nevertheless,
in previous studies it has been tested on the detection of prior
intentions (Agosta et al., 2011a) and in detecting reasons behind
white lies (Agosta et al., 2013). In the present study, we went a
step further by demonstrating that past intentions can be reliably
identified using the aIAT with high accuracy (comparable with
those previously reported for other versions of aIAT; see Sartori
et al., 2008)1. Since forensic applications usually need to prove
whether there was an intention behind a crime, this study is the
first showing that RTs-basedmemory detection techniques can be
useful in the detection of past intentions.
1Several independent research groups confirmed the accuracy level of the aIAT
(e.g., Hu and Rosenfeld, 2012; Hu et al., 2012; Freng and Kehn, 2013). Only
a study by Vargo and Petroczi (2013) reported a lower accuracy; however,
these authors used a brief version of the aIAT together with negative sentences,
which have to be avoided in aIAT according to its authors’ suggestions (Agosta
and Sartori, 2013). In her master’s thesis, Dr. Eleonora Zecchinato collected
data from 103 volunteer participants using original aIAT with no negative
statements, and she demonstrated that the accuracy was higher (Zecchinato,
2014).
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